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Subject matter: a modest proposal
Matteo Plebani and Giuseppe Spolaore
Abstract
The notion of subject matter is a key concern of contemporary philos-
ophy of language and logic. A central task for a theory of subject matter
is to characterise the notion of sentential subject matter, that is, to assign
to each sentence of a given language a subject matter that may count
as its subject matter. In this paper we elaborate upon David Lewis’
account of subject matter. Lewis’ proposal is simple and elegant but
lacks a satisfactory characterisation of sentential subject matter. Draw-
ing on linguistic literature on focus and on the question under discussion,
we o↵er a neo-Lewisian account of subject matter, which retains all the
virtues of Lewis’ but also includes an attractive characterisation of sen-
tential subject matter.
Keywords: Subject matter; Aboutness; Focus; Questions; David Lewis
1 Introduction
Subject matter has become a hot topic in contemporary philosophy of language
and logic (see, e.g., Yablo 2014, Fine 2016, Osorio-Kupferblum 2016, Hawke
2017, Berto 2018, Moltmann 2018, Felka 2018). It is widely held that an
important task for a theory of subject matter is to include a satisfactory
characterisation of the notion of sentential subject matter: to be able to tell,
given a sentence  , which subject matter(s)   is about (see, e.g., Yablo 2014: 1,
Hawke 2017: § 3).
In this paper we take as our starting point one of the earliest and simplest
accounts of subject matter, David Lewis’ (1988a, 1988b) proposal. Lewis’
account has many virtues, but Lewis does not o↵er a plausible characterisation
of sentential subject matter. Drawing on insights from the linguistic literature
on the notions of focus and of question under discussion, we show how to
extend Lewis’ proposal to an account of subject matter that retains all the
virtues of the original one, but also yields an attractive characterisation of
sentential subject matter. We will refer to our neo-Lewisian account as the
modest proposal.
There are many reasons to be interested in the notion of (sentential) sub-
ject matter and cognate notions like aboutness (the relation that a sentence
bears to its subject matter). Yablo (2014, Introduction) mentions three. The
first is that these notions are interesting in their own right: we ordinarily
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employ them, and yet it is hard to characterise them precisely. A second mo-
tivation is that sentential subject matter (what a sentence is about) can play
an important role in a theory of meaning: Yablo is interested in making ‘sub-
ject matter an independent factor in meaning, constrained but not determined
by truth conditions’ (2014: 2). Finally, subject matter can help shed light on
traditional metaphysical issues, for instance on the problem of the ontological
commitment of number talk (see Yablo 2014, ch. 5).
In this paper, we are mainly concerned with the first two motivations to
care about subject matter.
As for the first motivation, the modest proposal contributes to the task
of elucidating the notion of sentential subject matter by modifying an elegant
and powerful account of subject matter. The modest proposal is based on a
combination of ideas from the philosophical and linguistic literature on subject
matter that is so natural to seem obvious, but has never been fully developed
and compared with alternative accounts.1 The present paper, then, fills a
gap in the literature. Moreover, as we point out in the concluding section, the
modest proposal has some advantages over rival accounts and is flexible; hence
it could be fruitfully compared to and integrated with existing approaches.
Finally, the modest proposal deepens our understanding of Lewis’ account of
subject matter, showing that most of the standard objections against it can
be addressed rather easily.
Concerning the second motivation, our account provides an example of
a two-component semantics (Berto, Hawke & Hornischer (ms)). In a two-
components semantics, not only truth conditions do not determine subject
matter (i.e., subject matter is hyperintensional), but also subject matter does
not determine truth conditions. Subject matter is hyperintensional on most
of the existing accounts. It is pretty customary to let two tautologies like
‘Grass is green or it is not’ and ‘Snow is white or it is not’ be about di↵erent
subject matters. However, our account does something more. In our account,
there is no general rule to recover the truth conditions of a sentence from
its subject matter. Moreover, the account allows some logically independent
(atomic) sentences to be about the same subject matter. We will elaborate
upon this theme in the concluding section of the paper, where we also discuss
some limitations of the account in its present form.
In sum, the modest proposal is a simple, intuitive account of sentential sub-
ject matter that combines ideas from the philosophical and linguistic literature
1 A footnote in Rothschild 2017: 790 (fn 5) hints in a direction close to that of the modest
proposal. However, Rothschild neither develops the idea nor compare it with alternative
accounts.
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and has some original, attractive features. In light of these considerations, we
think that the modest proposal should be part of the conversation on subject
matter.
Let us look ahead. In sections 2 and 3, we introduce Lewis’ account of sub-
ject matter and explain why Lewis does not provide a satisfactory characterisa-
tion of sentential subject matter. In sections 4–6, we present our neo-Lewisian
account of sentential subject matter. Finally, in section 7, we highlight the
virtues of the modest proposal, along with some limitations, and compare it
to alternative accounts of subject matter presently available.
2 Lewis on subject matter
A Lewisian subject matter (SM) is a partition of the set of possible worlds
(the logical space) or the equivalence relation induced by such a partition.2 A
Lewisian SM can also be presented as a set of propositions, namely, the set of
those propositions that count as complete answers to a certain interrogative
sentence. If we follow a common practice among semanticists and we equate a
question with the set of its complete answers,3 we can also say that a Lewisian
SM is a question (see Yablo 2014: § 2.1 for a discussion). For instance, using
boldface for subject matters, the number of stars is the family of sets of
possible worlds composed by the set of worlds in which there are no stars, the
set of worlds in which there is exactly one star, the set of worlds in which there
are exactly two stars, and so on. The number of stars can also be identified
with the equivalence relation that relates two worlds w and w0 if and only if
in w there are as many stars as in w0. The number of stars can also be
presented as a set of propositions (conceived here as sets of possible worlds):
the propositions that there are no stars, that there is one star, that there are
2 A partition F of the set S is a family of nonempty, mutually disjoint subsets of S
(called cells) whose union is equal to S. An equivalence relation is a binary relation R
that is reflexive (for all x, xRx), symmetric (if xRy, then yRx), and transitive (if xRy and
yRz, then xRz). Partition and equivalence relations are interdefinable: if we start with an
equivalence relation R on S and assign every element of S to the set of elements of S that
are in R with it, we obtain a partition of S; if we start with a partition F of S, the relation
belonging to the same cell of F is an equivalence relation.
3 The first semantic treatment of questions as sets of potential answers is in Hamblin
1973. The idea that the content of a question can be equated with the set of the propositions
expressed by its complete possible answers (and thus with a partition of the logical space)
is due to Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984). See Cross & Roelofsen 2018 for an overview of the
semantics and pragmatics of questions.
3
two stars, . . . , i.e., the answers to the interrogative sentence ‘How many stars
are there?’. Finally, the number of stars can be identified with the question
expressed by the interrogative sentence ‘How many stars are there?’. We say
that two worlds agree on SM m if and only if they are m-equivalent, i.e., when
the same answer to the relevant question is true in both worlds.
It’s true that sometimes we think of subject matters not as questions but
rather as parts of the world (see Lewis 1988a: 161–2 and Hawke 2017). How-
ever, it appears that some subject matters do not correspond to parts of the
world. Lewis’ example is the number of stars.
Maybe an ingenious ontologist could devise a theory saying that
each world has its nos-part, as we may call it, such that the nos-
parts of two worlds are exact duplicates i↵ those two worlds have
equally many stars. Maybe—and maybe not. We shouldn’t rely on
it. Rather, we should say that being exactly alike with respect to a
subject matter may or may not be a matter of duplication between
the parts of worlds which that subject matters picks out. (Lewis
1988b: 12)
Moreover, as Lewis (1988a) notes, given a part of the world, we can define an
equivalence relation: two worlds are equivalent if, and only if, the relevant part
of one world is exactly alike its counterpart in the other world. Two worlds are
equivalent with respect to the SM the XVII century if, and only if, either
the XVII century of one world is an exact duplicate of the XVII century of the
other, or both worlds lack a counterpart of the XVII century (see Humberstone
2000 and Yablo 2014: § 2.1). Thus, arguably, partition-based accounts of SM
are more general than part-based ones.
Lewis’ account is simple and elegant. It preserves the natural connection
between subject matters and questions: the act of addressing a subject matter
can be smoothly described as an attempt to answer a question (see also Hawke
2017). Moreover, Lewis’ account allows us to define many interesting relations
between subject matters, such as:
Parthood: m is part of n if and only if n is a refinement of m (i.e., if and
only if n-equivalence entails m-equivalence). For instance, the number
of stars and the number of planets includes as part the number of
stars because two worlds cannot have the same number of stars and the
same number of planets without having the same number of stars.
Orthogonality: m is orthogonal to n if and only if every m-cell intersects
every n-cell. If we think of subject matters as questions, this means that
every answer to the question m is compatible with every answer to the
question n. In this sense, the number of dodos is orthogonal to the
number of goats.
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3 Lewis on sentential subject matter
Lewis’ definition of subject matter as a partition of the logical space does not
tell us, given a sentence  , how to find the subject matter(s) of  . Lewis is
able to define an interesting relation between sentences and subject matters,
namely, that of a sentence being entirely about a subject matter. A sentence  
is entirely aboutm if and only if   has the same truth-value in allm-equivalent
worlds. ‘The number of planets is nine’, for instance, is entirely about the
number of planets, because if the number of planets is the same in w and
w
0, then either ‘The number of planets is nine’ is true in both worlds or it is
false in both worlds.
However, for any sentence  , there are lots of SMs   is entirely about. At
one extreme,   is entirely about the subject matter with the thinnest possible
cells: one world per cell (see Yablo 2014)—let us call it the universal SM.
At the other extreme,   is entirely about the SM with just two cells, one
containing the worlds where   is true and the other, the worlds where   is not
true—let us call it the binary SM of  .
Neither extreme is, in general, a good choice for the role of sentential
subject matter. On the one hand, if we assign to every sentence the universal
SM as its subject matter, then all the sentences turn out to have the same
subject matter. On the other hand, if we assign to each sentence its binary
SM as its subject matter, then we face at least three problems:
– Sentential SMs fail to be hyper-intensional: if   and  are true in the same
possible worlds, then   and  have the same SM. This is an unwelcome
result: it is commonly considered a desideratum for a theory of aboutness
to distinguish the subject matter of two tautologies with di↵erent non-
logical vocabularies: e.g., ‘John is bald or John is not bald’ should be about
John’s hairiness, ‘Mary is rich or Mary is not rich’ should be about Mary’s
economical status (see, e.g., Hawke 2017: § 3.2).
– Inclusion relations between distinct sentential SMs are blocked: a two-cells
partition m refines a two-cells partition n only if m = n. Given that
binary SMs are two-cells partitions, this means that if the SM of   is part
of that of  , then   and  have the same SM. However, there should be
cases where the subject matter of a sentence properly includes the subject
matter of another: e.g., the subject matter of a conjunction should contain
the subject matters of both of its conjuncts as proper parts.
– Orthogonality overgeneralises: if   and  are logically independent, then
the SM of   is orthogonal to that of  (see Lewis 1988b). As a result, e.g.,
independent sentences of form Fa and Fb are bound to have orthogonal
SMs despite sharing the same predicate. Or, to take an example similar
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to the one in Lewis 1988a: 169–70, ‘John is in London or John is in Paris’
and ‘John is in London or John is in Berlin’ end up being about orthogonal
SMs, whereas intuitively both sentences are about John’s whereabouts.
Even ignoring these problems, the view that, at least in many cases, the SM
of a sentence lies somewhere in between the universal SM and the sentence’s
binary SM is plausible. Think again about the sentence ‘The number of planets
is nine’. There seems to be a natural candidate for the role of subject matter
of this sentence: ‘The number of planets is nine’ is about the number of
planets, which is neither the universal SM nor the binary SM of ‘The number
of planets is nine’.
In what follows, we will describe one way to associate sentences with
Lewisian SMs that (with rare exceptions) lie in between the universal SM
and the sentences’ binary SMs.
4 Informal outline of the proposal: atomic sentences
Let us take stock. The goal we have just set for ourselves is that of extending
Lewis’ proposal with an account of sentential subject matter, that is to say,
that of making precise which Lewisian SM, or SMs, correspond to each sen-
tence of a given language. To this aim, Lewis’ notion of being entirely about is
a useful starting point: it is plausible to require that a sentence   be entirely
about its SM(s), viz., that all worlds agreeing on  ’s SM also agree on  ’s
truth value. However, this requirement does not su ce to reduce the number
of possible options enough: given a sentence  , there are too many subject
matters   is entirely about. And, as seen in the previous section, simply choos-
ing either the universal SM or  ’s binary SM will not do. We need another
way to associate sentences with SMs on principled grounds.
We have seen that Lewisian SMs can be thought of as questions. Accord-
ingly, the relation between Lewisian SMs and sentences perfectly parallels the
one between questions and their possible answers. Thus, our problem becomes:
how is it possible to associate sentences and questions on principled grounds?
Luckily enough, this problem—the problem of associating a sentence with
a corresponding question (‘the question under discussion’)—has received wide
attention in the philosophical and linguistic literature. What has emerged is
that there is an intimate relation between the questions corresponding to a
simple sentence and the sentence’s possible focus structures, viz., the ways
in which the sentence can be focused upon.4 In the literature on focus it is
4 See, e.g., Rooth 1996: 271. For an early discussion of the relation between questions and
focus, see Prior & Prior 1955: 44–5; see also Dretske 1972 on the significance of focus. See
Rooth 1985, 1992 for semantic proposals in which focus structures are made to correspond
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standard to distinguish between di↵erent types of focus (see, e.g, Kiss 1998,
Gussenhoven 2007). Throughout the paper, reference is always to so-called in-
formation (or presentational) focus, viz., the kind of focus whose role is that of
marking certain sentential constituents as conveying new or non-presupposed
information. Consider, for instance, a simple sentence like
(1) Fiona is happy.
There are basically three focus structures this sentence can have (small caps
mark prosodic emphasis):
(1a) Fiona is happy;
(1b) Fiona is happy;
(1c) Fiona is happy.
In (1a) the focus is on the term (term focus), in (1b) it is on the predicate (pred-
icate focus), and in (1c) the focus is on the whole sentence’s truth (sentence
focus). Statements (1a)–(1c) are perfectly on-topic answers to, respectively:
(1a0) Who is happy?
(1b0) How is Fiona?
(1c0) Is Fiona happy?
Let us observe that the focus part of each sentence can be o↵ered as an answer
to the corresponding question (see, e.g., Gussenhoven 2007: 91). For instance,
the focus expression in (1a), ‘Fiona’, provides a perfectly appropriate answer
to the corresponding question (1a0), ‘Who is happy?’. Let us also note that
an answer with the ‘wrong’ focus structure, for instance (1a) as an answer
to (1b0), sounds slightly o↵ topic and pragmatically infelicitous in ordinary
contexts.
Now, our guiding thought is that what holds for a sentence’s correlated
questions also holds for the sentence’s correlated (Lewisian) SMs. Thus, (1)
will have three correlated SMs, each corresponding to questions (1a0)–(1c0):
Happy individuals, Fiona (or Fiona’s mood), and (1)’s binary SM, re-
spectively. The correlation between (1)’s possible focus structures and the
corresponding questions and SMs is summarised in Table 1 below.
Focus structure Question SM
Fiona is happy (term focus) Who is happy? Happy individuals
Fiona is happy (predicate focus) How is Fiona? Fiona
Fiona is happy (sentence focus) Is Fiona happy? (1)’s binary SM
Table 1: Sentence (1): focus structures, correlated questions and SMs.
to the contents of questions, understood as sets of alternatives.
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As for the SM Happy individuals, we shall identify it with the equiva-
lence relation two worlds are in if and only if the same individuals are happy
in both worlds and the same individuals are not happy in both worlds. The
second, negative requirement is harmless in practice, and it will prove useful
in the formal development of the proposal. The SM Fiona can be identified
with the equivalence relation holding between two worlds exactly when Fiona
has the same intrinsic properties in both (see Lewis 1988a,b).
The same pattern holds in general: a sentence of the form Fa will have
three potentially correlated questions: What is F?, How is a?, and Whether
Fa. In turn, these questions correspond to three SMs: things that are F, a
(or a’s features), and the sentence’s binary SM.
It is straightforward to extend our approach to binary relational sentences
like:
(2) Al is married to Tom.
The main di↵erence is that, in this case, we have five focus structures instead
of three (see Table 2).
Focus structure Question SM
Al is married to Tom Who is married to Tom? Tom’s better half
Al is married to Tom Who is Al married to? Al’s better half
Al is married to Tom Who is married to whom? Married couples
Al is married to Tom How is Al related to Tom? Al’s relations to Tom
Al is married to Tom Is Al married to Tom? (2)’s binary SM.
Table 2: Sentence (2): focus structures, correlated questions and SMs.
It is a common assumption that English simple sentences receive a default
focus structure in silent reading and in the absence of contextual information
to the contrary (see, e.g., Carlson 2015: 64). More specifically, the focus is by
default on the predicate in simple unary sentences (predicate focus), and on
the second term in binary, relational sentences (term focus). We assume that
sentence focus is a highly marked, limiting case.
The general idea should be clear enough. Once the focus structure of a
sentence is made precise, the sentence can be made to correspond to a question
on principled grounds. Questions, in turn, naturally correspond to SMs.5
5 There is a debate in the linguistic literature on the extent to which focus is a semantic
phenomenon rather than a pragmatic one. Our account of sentential SM is close in spirit
to semantic approaches to focus such as the alternative semantics proposed in Rooth 1985,
1992 (see Rooth 1996 for an overview of the semantic approaches to focus). We take no
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So far so good as for an intuitive presentation of our approach to the
sentential SM of atomic sentences. In the next section, we shall make these
informal insights more precise and general, with reference to a very simple
formal language.
5 A formal presentation of the proposal
Let L  be an ordinary first order language with individual variables x, x1 . . . ,
individual constants a, a1 . . . and predicates F , F1, . . . , F 21 , . . . , F
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1 . . . We
assume that L  has been defined in the usual way.
Our language L is identical to L  except for a single addition: constants
and predicates can be boldfaced. Boldfaced constants are called f-constants
and boldfaced predicates are called f-predicates. We shall speak of f-terms to
indicate both f-constants and variables of L. For any individual or predicate
constant l, the corresponding f-letter l is called the f-variant of l. Intuitively,
f-letters are letters with focus. Thus for instance, in Fa the focus is on the
constant a, in Fa the focus is on the predicate F , and so on. If no f-letter
occurs in an atomic sentence p, then p is sentence-focused. Thus, e.g., Fa
is a sentence-focused sentence of L.6 Language L can be formally defined as
follows:
– If p is an atomic sentence of L , then p is a sentence-focused atomic sentence
of L.
– If p is an atomic sentence (formula) Fnm(t1, . . . , tn) of L
 , then any sentence
(formula) p[ci, . . . , cj] obtained by replacing constants ci, . . . , cj in p with
their f-variants ci, . . . , cj is a term-focused atomic sentence (formula) of L.
– If p is an atomic sentence Fnm(c1, . . . , cn) of L
 , then Fnm(c1, . . . , cn) is a
predicate-focused atomic sentence of L.
– If   and  are formulae of L and v any variable, then ¬ , 8v , and   ^  
are formulae of L.
It is worth noting a limitation of our formal treatment: it does not allow
having quantifiers in bold (i.e., quantifiers cannot be focused upon). However,
as we are going to see in section 6, our proposal is still able to assign intuitively
plausible subject matters to quantified sentences.7
stance as to whether our proposal can be made consistent with other, more pragmatically
oriented approaches such as those proposed in Ginzburg 1996 and Roberts 2012.
6 Let us stress that this notational choice is only due to simplicity: we do not mean to
suggest that sentence focus is the default case. Quite to the contrary, we take sentence focus
as a limiting case (see above, p. 8).
7 Not allowing to have focus on the quantifiers helps us to keep the framework as simple
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We assume that a standard possible-world semantics has been defined for
L. More specifically, we assume that (i) each predicate of L has been made to
correspond to an intension, viz., a function from possible worlds to extensions;
and (ii) for each world w, the domain Dw of the individuals that exist relative
to w has been defined (we make no assumption as to whether the underlying
model involves a single domain or variable domains); (iii) for each formula  
of L and each assignment g to the variables of L, a corresponding set of worlds
| |g has been defined, which represents  ’s satisfaction-conditions relative to g,
viz., the set of worlds where   is satisfied by assignment g. We write w, g ✏  
to mean that w 2 | |g, viz., that   is satisfied by g in w. We assume that
truth is defined in the usual way, as satisfaction by all assignments. We write
w ✏   to mean that   is true in world w.
Our aim is to provide an account of the sentential SM of all sentences of
L, that is, to specify, for each sentence of L, the corresponding SM. Here is
our general plan:
A. Provide an account of the sentential SM of atomic sentences of L;
B. Extend the account A to atomic formulae of L (deal with variables);
C. Extend the account B to molecular formulae of L (deal with connectives);
D. Extend the account C to quantified formulae of L (deal with quantifiers).
5.1 An account of the sentential SM of atomic sentences of L
Atomic sentences of L can have three kinds of focus structures, namely, sen-
tence focus, predicate focus, and term focus. We shall discuss these possibili-
ties in turn. Hereafter, we write  ( ) for the SM of the formula  .
If p is a sentence-focused atomic sentence of L, we stipulate that the SM
of p is just its binary SM, viz., the two-cells SM upon which two worlds agree
if and only if p has the same truth-value in both. More formally:
Sentence focus:
If p is a sentence-focused atomic sentence,  (p) = {(w,w0) : w ✏ p , w0 ✏ p}
As for predicate focus, let us start with the monadic case for illustrative
purposes. Intuitively, given a predicate-focused, monadic atom Fa, its SM,
 (Fa), is such that two worlds agree upon it if and only if the individual
a has the same relevant features in both worlds. Reference to relevance is
important: arguably, if two worlds agree on every feature possessed by an
individual a, including such ‘bogus’ conditions as being such that individual b
is a plumber, then they must be identical simpliciter. Here we remain silent as
as possible. We plan to explore other ways to assign subject matters to quantified statements
in future work.
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to how this notion of relevance is cashed out, provided that the set of relevant
predicates (those expressing relevant properties) includes the predicate used in
the atomic sentence.8 How to extend these informal remarks to the relational
case is obvious. From a formal viewpoint, our approach can be spelled out as
follows:
Predicate focus,
monadic:  (Pc) = {(w,w0) : For all relevant predicates X, w ✏ Xc ,
w
0 ✏ Xc}.
n-adic:  (R(c1, . . . , cn)) = {(w,w0) : For all relevant predicates Xn,
w ✏ Xn(c1, . . . , cn) , w0 ✏ Xn(c1, . . . , cn)}.
Let us turn to term focus. As hinted at in the informal presentation of
our proposal, we require that two worlds agree on the SM of a term-focused
monadic sentence if and only if they agree on both the extension and the anti-
extension of the corresponding condition, which means that they agree on both
the extension of that condition and on their domain.9 Such a requirement is
irrelevant in the atomic case, and we impose it for the sake of uniformity,
in light of our approach to quantified formulae (more on this point in due
course). Also for the sake of uniformity, we assume that a set of extended
assignments g+, g+1 . . . has been defined, which assign a value to all f-terms
of L, that is, to both variables and f-constants of L. In other words, for any
f-term t and any extended assignment g+, g+(t) is an element of the domain
of individuals (possibly, a di↵erent element for di↵erent assignments). The
notion of a sentence   being true in a world w relative to extended assignment
g
+ (in symbols: w, g+ ✏  ) is defined in a way that perfectly parallels the
definition of the standard notion of satisfaction by an assignment in a world.
Intuitively, for the limited purpose of providing an account of sentential SM
for L, we treat f-constants exactly as if they were variables.
8 One might identify, as we did with Fiona in the previous section, the individual’s
relevant properties with its intrinsic properties; see also Hawke 2017.
9 Here we are using ‘extension’ and ‘anti-extension’ in an intuitive sense: the extension of
a condition at a world w is the subset of the domain of w composed by the objects satisfying
that condition, and the anti-extension is the complement of the extension relative to the
domain of w. The way we set up things in the formal development of the proposal ensures
that when two worlds agree on the subject matter of an atomic sentence with term focus,
then the (anti)extension, in this intuitive sense, of the corresponding condition is the same
in the two worlds.
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Term focus,





general: If p is an atomic sentence of L involving f-constants c1, . . . , cn, then
 (p) = {(w,w0) : Dw = Dw0 and for any g+: w, g+ ✏ p , w0, g+ ✏ p}.
5.2 An account of the sentential SM of atomic formulae of L
In dealing with open formulae of L, our guiding thought is that free variables
have the same impact on SM as f-constants. This is reasonable. Let us ask,
for instance, what SM might correspond to an open formula like ‘Al is married
to x’. By far the most natural choice is Al’s better half, viz., the same SM
we associated with ‘Al is married to Tom’. This choice allows us to deal with
term focus and open formulae in a uniform way, by means of a single clause
(remember that an f-term is a term that is either an f-constant or a variable):
Open atoms and term focus: If p is an atomic formula of L involving
f-terms t1, . . . , tn, then  (p) = {(w,w0) : Dw = Dw0 and for all g+:
w, g
+ ✏ p , w0, g+ ✏ p}.
Let us summarise our general account of the sentential SM of atoms of L.
If p is any atomic formula of L, we have that:
If p is sentence-focused, then  (p) = {(w,w0) : w ✏ p , w0 ✏ p};
If p = R(c1, . . . , cn), then  (R(c1, . . . , cn)) = {(w,w0) : For all Xn, w ✏
X
n(c1, . . . , cn) , w0 ✏ Xn(c1, . . . , cn)};
If p is an atomic formula of L involving f-terms t1, . . . , tn, then  (p) =
{(w,w0) : Dw = Dw0 and for all g+: w, g+ ✏ p , w0, g+ ✏ p}.
Now consider an atomic sentence p:
Fact. Sentence p is entirely about its subject matter (in the sense of section
3: if two worlds agree on  (p), they agree on the truth value of p).
Proof. We prove this fact by cases:
1. Sentence focus: trivial.
2. Predicate focus: in order for w and w0 to agree on  (p) it must be the
case that, for all relevant X, X(a1, . . . , an) is true in w if and only if
X(a1, . . . , an) is true in w0. In 5.1, we required that the property or relation
expressed by p’s predicate be one of the relevant Xs. Thus, p is true in w
if and only if p is true in w0.
3. Term focus: w and w0 agree on  (p), so the same n-tuples satisfy the
condition associated with p in both worlds, hence the n-tuple formed by
the individuals denoted by the focused terms present in p satisfies the
condition associated with p in w if and only if that n-tuple satisfies the
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condition associated with p in w0. Hence p is true in w if and only if p is
true in w0.
6 Connectives and quantifiers
We deal with complex sentences by adopting an atom-based approach in the
sense of Hawke (2017). Using  ( ) to denote the subject matter of   and the
symbol + to denote the operation of combining two subject matters, we have
that:
Negation:  (¬ ) =  ( )
Conjunction:  (  ^  ) =  ( ) +  ( )
The subject matter of the negation of a formula is identical to the subject
matter of the original formula, and the subject matter of a formula whose
main connective is a conjunction (or any other truth-conditional binary con-
nective we might want to introduce in the language) is the smallest subject
matter that contains as parts the subject matters of its immediate subfor-
mulae (remember the definition of the parthood relation between SMs from
section 2). Since subject matters are equivalence relations in our proposal, it
is natural to identify + with set-theoretical intersection, for the intersection
of two equivalence relations is an equivalence relation stronger than both. In
what follows, we assume that + has been defined in this way.
Having assigned subject matters to open formulae, we can take as the
subject matter of a quantified sentence the subject matter of its immediate
subformula:
Quantifiers:  (8x ) =  (9x ) =  ( ).
This approach is fairly plausible: ‘Everyone loves Maria” is a perfectly felici-
tous answer to Who loves Maria?, so its SM is Maria’s lovers.
As a consequence of our construction, we have that:
Containment. The subject matter of a sentence contains as parts (see section
2) the subject matters of the sentence’s subformulae.
We can now prove the following:
Result. Every sentence is entirely about its subject matter.
If we focus on quantifier-free sentences, Result follows from (i) the fact that
atomic sentences are entirely about their subject matters, (ii) Containment
and (iii) the following fact, discussed in Humberstone 2000: 57 and Lewis 1988a
(where it is called ‘Special Compositional Principle’): if each of sentences
 1, . . . , n is entirely about a subject matter m, then any truth-functional
compound of these sentences is entirely about m. In order to cover also
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quantified sentences, here is the full proof by induction on the complexity
of formulae.
Proof. Suppose that w and w0 agree on  ( ), and let g+ be any assignment.
We shall prove that w, g+ ✏  , w0, g+ ✏  .
1. Base case: for atomic sentences, see section 5.2; for atomic formulae, the
result follows from the clause in section 5.2.
2. Inductive step: Let   be ( 1^ 2). Given that w and w0 agree on  ( ), by
Containment they must agree also on  ( 1) and  ( 2); by the inductive
hypothesis, this entails that they agree on the truth-value of  1 and on
the truth-value of  2, hence they must agree on the truth value of ( 1 ^
 2) =  . The case where   = ¬ 1 is analogous. If   = 8x 1, then
either the quantification is vacuous or not. If it is vacuous, then 8x 1
is equivalent to  1, so the result follows by the inductive hypothesis. If
the quantification is not vacuous, then there must be at least one atomic
subformula  of   containing x. Given that w an w0 agree on  ( ), then
(by Containment) they must also agree on  ( ), which entails, given
the clauses from section 5.2, that Dw = Dw0 . Let g+ be any assignment:
by the inductive hypothesis, for every x-variant g0 of g+, we have that
w, g
0 ✏  1 , w0, g0 ✏  1; given that Dw = Dw0 , g0(x) 2 Dw , g0(x) 2 Dw0 ,
so w, g+ ✏ 8x 1 , w0, g+ ✏ 8x 1.
7 The discreet charm of the modest proposal
In section 3, we discussed the problems raised by the idea of identifying the
subject matter of a sentence with its binary subject matter. The modest
proposal solves all these problems:
– The modest proposal is hyperintensional: two sentences endowed with the
same truth conditions need not have the same subject matter. E.g., pro-
vided that the subject matters of Fa and Gb are di↵erent, the subject mat-
ter of Fa ^ ¬Fa, which is identical to that of Fa, is di↵erent from that of
Gb^¬Gb (which is identical to that of Gb). This result holds independently
of the focus structure of the atomic sentences.
– Intuitive inclusion relations are preserved: e.g., the subject matter of a
sentence  is a proper part of the subject matter of   ^  .
– The orthogonality problem disappears: e.g., ‘Fiona is happy’ and ‘Al is
happy’ share the same subject matter even though the two sentences are
logically independent.
Moreover, sentences of the forms R(a, b) and R(b, a) are about di↵erent sub-
ject matters, thus satisfying a natural desideratum (Yablo 2014, Hawke 2017).
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In our account, ‘Al is married to Tom’ is about Tom’s better half, whereas
‘Al is married to Tom’ is about Al’s better half (see section 4).
Finally, note that, in our account, the subject matter of an arbitrary state-
ment like Gb need not be included in a subject matter of a contradiction like
Fa^¬Fa. This marks a further point of departure from Lewis (see 1988b: 168–
9).
A minor modification of our proposal yields an even stronger result. If we
limited ourselves to requiring, for two worlds to agree on the subject matter
of an atomic sentence with term focus, that the same individuals satisfy the
predicate in both worlds, then the subject matter of Fa^¬Fa could be made
orthogonal to that of Gb. This means that, in the resulting account, there
is ground for regarding some instances of Ex Falso Quodlibet as fallacies of
irrelevance, in the specific sense that the subject matter of the premise is
orthogonal to that of the conclusion. Again, this is not the case in Lewis’
(1988b) original account.
These results are interesting, because they show that one can obtain a fine
characterisation of sentential subject matter without departing from standard
semantic practice. Our account does not require the underlying semantics to
use anything but run-of-the-mill, possible-world semantic resources. For in-
stance, it does not require truthmaker semantics (cf. Yablo 2014, Fine 2016),
impossible worlds (Lewis 1988b), or structured propositions (Hawke 2017).
(Although the basic idea behind our account—taking focus as a guide to con-
necting subject matters with linguistic structures—is consistent with any of
these nonstandard semantic approaches.)
But the account has other virtues beyond its conservativity. Just as the
original account by Lewis, it preserves the intuitive connection between subject
matters and questions. It also links the question associated with a sentence
to the sentence’s focus structure, connecting Lewis’ notion of subject matter
and the linguists’ treatment of the question under discussion.
It preserves the idea, which inspired early accounts of the notion of about-
ness by Ryle (1933), Goodman (1961) and others, that what a sentence is
about depends in part on its non-logical vocabulary (non-logical vocabulary
is not the only factor, though: remember that the subject matters of R(a, b)
and R(b, a) are di↵erent). A further virtue of the account is its uniformity:
sentential subject matters are the same kind of things as subject matters in
general, namely, Lewisian subject matters (i.e., partitions or equivalence re-
lations on the set of possible worlds or, if you prefer, questions, in the sense
made clear in section 2). Each sentence of L is assigned one subject matter,
not a pair composed of its pro-subject matter and its anti-subject matter, like
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in Yablo 2014.10
Moreover, the account respects the idea, defended by Yablo, that truth
conditions and subject matter are two independent factors that jointly deter-
mine the meaning of a sentence (Yablo 2014: 2). Not only truth conditions
cannot determine subject matter; in our account, also the reverse holds: there
is no way to recover the truth conditions of a sentence from its subject mat-
ter. Indeed, something even stronger holds: there is also no way to recover
the binary subject matter of a sentence from its subject matter.11
In our framework, when an atomic sentence receives sentence focus, then
the subject matter of the sentence is its binary subject matter. However, it
is not possible to define a function that takes as input the subject matter of
a formula and outputs its binary subject matter, simply because there are
formulas with the same subject matter but di↵erent binary subject matters.
For instance, the SM of ‘Fiona is happy’ and ‘Al is happy’ is the same, i.e.,
happy people, despite the fact that the two sentences have di↵erent binary
subject matters.
We are not the only ones to regard the impossibility of recovering the truth
conditions of a sentence from its subject matter as a virtue of an account of
sentential SM (reference suppressed). After all, it is plausible to hold that
knowing what a sentence is about is not su cient for knowing its truth condi-
tions: ‘Fiona is happy’ and ‘Al is happy’ are both about happy people, in
the sense that they are both answers to the question ‘Who is happy?’, but they
say something di↵erent about that topic, precisely because they have di↵erent
truth conditions.
The full independence of truth conditions and sentential subject matter
tells the modest proposal apart from other accounts. In our framework there
is no operation that takes as input the subject matter of a formula and outputs
its binary subject matter. This entails that there is no operation that takes
as input the subject matter of a formula and outputs its truth conditions.
In those approaches in which the positive subject matter of a sentence is the
set of its truthmakers, the positive subject matter of a sentence determines its
truth conditions, because the worlds in which the sentence is true are precisely
those in which at least one of its truthmakers obtains (see Fine 2020: § 1).
10 Another respect in which Yablo’s account is less uniform than the present one is that he
has to use Lewisian subject matters for some purposes (see Yablo 2014: § 3.3), even though
in his account the subject matter of a sentence is not Lewisian.
11 The reasons why this result is stronger is that identity of truth conditions entails identity
of binary subject matter, but not vice versa (a sentence and its negation share the same
binary subject matter, but have di↵erent truth conditions).
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Also Hawke’s (2017) proposal su↵ers from a similar problem: in his ac-
count, the subject matter of an atomic sentence is akin to a structured propo-
sition; such a proposition does not determine a sentence’s truth conditions but,
contrary to the present account, it does determine its binary subject matter.
Our account di↵ers also from Yablo’s account. Yablo (2014) defines the
positive subject matter of a sentence   as a cover of the truth-set | | of that
sentence (i.e., as a family of subsets of | | such that their union is identical
to | |). The negative subject matter of a sentence is a cover of the set of
worlds where   is not true. The overall subject matter of a sentence is the
unordered pair of its positive and negative subject matters. This means that
in Yablo’s account it is possible to define a function that takes as input the
overall subject matter of a formula, i.e., the unordered pair of its positive and
negative subject matter, and returns as output the binary subject matter of
the formula, because the binary subject matter of a formula is identical to the
unordered pair of the union of its positive subject matter and the union of its
negative subject matter.
A further virtue of the account is that it is flexible: we have presented the
version of the account in which (i) subject matters are questions, (ii) questions
are sets of propositions, and (iii) propositions are sets of possible worlds, but
other variants might be obtained by retaining (i) and (ii) and giving up the
intensional conception of propositions, that is, (iii).
In our account, the subject matters of logically equivalent formulae might
be di↵erent, as we noted. And the subject matter of ‘Obama is human’, i.e.,
human beings, is di↵erent from the subject matter of ‘Felix is a cat’, i.e.,
cats, even though they both involve essential properties. If we switch to other
examples, though, the situation is more problematic: the subject matter of
‘Two is even’ should be even numbers and that of ‘Two is prime’ should
be prime numbers. But prime and even numbers are the same in all worlds,
so both even numbers and prime numbers are subject matters over which
all worlds agree: conceived as partitions, they are the trivial partition with
just one cell containing all worlds.
The source of this problems lies in the Lewisian conception of subject mat-
ters as (the partitions generated by) equivalence relations, quite independently
of how subject matters are connected to sentences. In the Lewisian framework
it might be natural to identify arithmetic with the subject matter over which
two worlds agree exactly when the arithmetical truths are the same in both
worlds and topology with the subject matter over which two worlds agree
exactly when the same topological truths hold in both. But given that the
arithmetical and the topological truths are necessary, arithmetic and topol-
ogy, conceived in this way, turn out to be the same subject matter, i.e., the
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trivial subject matter. Lewis (1988b) calls this the librarian problem, on ac-
count of the fact that, from the perspective of a librarian, topology and number
theory are two di↵erent subjects matter, with di↵erent sections of the library
dedicated to them.
How to modify the modest proposal in order to obtain an even more fine-
grained account of (sentential) subject matter is an interesting question, but
one that we must leave for future work. Here, we confine ourselves to a few
brief remarks.
First, it might be that, in order to solve the librarian problem, we need
to use impossible worlds, as Lewis suggested.12 But a virtue of the modest
account is to make it clear that we do not need impossible worlds to account
for some phenomena related to hyperintensionality. As an example, we do
not need impossible worlds to show that some instances of Ex Falso Quodlibet
constitute a fallacy of relevance.
Second, as we noted, it is possible to abandon the conception of propo-
sitions as sets of possible worlds and still retain many aspects of the modest
proposal (that subject matter are questions, that a question is a set of propo-
sitions, that there is a link between the subject matter of a sentence and its
focus structure).
Summing up: we have proposed an account of sentential subject matter
that combines Lewis’ conception of subject matter with some ideas from the
linguistic literature on the notions of focus and of question under discussion.
The result is technically simple and intuitively plausible. Maybe we need to
go beyond the modest proposal to obtain a fully satisfactory theory of subject
matter. Maybe, but we still think that the modest proposal deserves to be part
of the conversation on subject matter: it shows how much can be obtained with
conventional semantic tools, thereby deepening our understanding of where
exactly the need for non-conventional semantic tools arises.
12 Actually, even in a purely intensional framework, the intension of ‘prime number’ is
di↵erent from the intension of ‘even number’. This di↵erence might be exploited to distin-
guish the two subject matters prime numbers and even numbers without resorting to
impossible worlds. Here we do not have the space to discuss this strategy and how it can be
made compatible with Lewis’ conception of subject matter.
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